EnclaveDom: Privilege Separation for Large-TCB Applications in Trusted
  Execution Environments by Melara, Marcela S. et al.
EnclaveDom: Privilege Separation for Large-TCB Applications in Trusted
Execution Environments
Marcela S. Melara1, Michael J. Freedman2, Mic Bowman1
1Intel Labs, 2Princeton University
Abstract
Trusted executions environments (TEEs) such as Intel® SGX
provide hardware-isolated execution areas in memory, called
enclaves. By running only the most trusted application com-
ponents in the enclave, TEEs enable developers to minimize
the TCB of their applications thereby helping to protect sen-
sitive application data. However, porting existing applica-
tions to TEEs often requires considerable refactoring efforts,
as TEEs provide a restricted interface to standard OS fea-
tures. To ease development efforts, TEE application devel-
opers often choose to run their unmodified application in a
library OS container that provides a full in-enclave OS inter-
face. Yet, this large-TCB development approach now leaves
sensitive in-enclave data exposed to potential bugs or vul-
nerabilities in third-party code imported into the application.
Importantly, because the TEE libOS and the application run
in the same enclave address space, even the libOS manage-
ment data structures (e.g. file descriptor table) may be vul-
nerable to attack, where in traditional OSes these data struc-
tures may be protected via privilege isolation.
We present EnclaveDom, a privilege separation system
for large-TCB TEE applications that partitions an enclave
into tagged memory regions, and enforces per-region access
rules at the granularity of individual in-enclave functions.
EnclaveDom is implemented on Intel SGX using Memory
Protection Keys (MPK) [23] for memory tagging. To evalu-
ate the security and performance impact of EnclaveDom, we
integrated EnclaveDom with the Graphene-SGX [11] library
OS. While no product or component can be absolutely se-
cure, our prototype helps protect internal libOS management
data structures against tampering by application-level code.
At every libOS system call, EnclaveDom then only grants ac-
cess to those internal data structures which the syscall needs
to perform its task. Our EnclaveDom prototype imposes
reasonable performance and modest memory overheads on
Graphene-SGX.
1 Introduction
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as Intel
SGX [21, 28] enable developers to create execution areas,
called enclaves with enhanced protection within a CPU. At
its core, a TEE aims to provide confidentiality of sensitive
application code and data in the presence of untrusted or vul-
nerable system software. In other words, the goal of TEEs
is to allow developers to reduce the TCB of applications by
placing only the most security-critical functionality in the en-
clave, and leaving the majority of application function the
untrusted context.
Yet, deploying existing applications to TEEs typically re-
quires that developers significantly re-architect their appli-
cations. In the case of Intel SGX, for instance, applications
may not make direct system calls from within an enclave.
Thus, Intel SGX application development has been shifting
towards a containerized model, in which unmodified applica-
tions run on top of a TEE-specific library OS (libOS) inside
an enclave [3,5,11,39,40]. These libOSes provide a general
system call interface that transparently handles all enclave-
to-untrusted transitions needed to call system software.
However, this practice vastly increases the TCB of an ap-
plication, which now includes any untrusted third-party code
as well as the underlying TEE libOS. Including third-party
libraries within an enclave is problematic for two main rea-
sons. First, application programmers rarely have the time,
expertise, or even authority, to prioritize security and pri-
vacy in their development process [1, 2, 4]. Thus, developers
cannot be expected to fully inspect the source code of ev-
ery library they need for their application, meaning that any
vulnerabilities or bugs in imported third-party software may
remain undetected. Indeed, software supply chain attacks
are becoming increasingly common, as adversaries leverage
the widespread use of open-source libraries to disseminate
malicious code (e.g., [10, 14]).
Nevertheless, the convenience of third-party libraries
makes them indispensable to today’s software development
practices. Developers rely on community trust, especially in
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open-source libraries, hoping that the third party whose code
they import has not published malicious code and otherwise
done their due diligence to eliminate any security vulnera-
bilities. For example, in spite of numerous examples of data
leak bugs in security-critical libraries such as OpenSSL [32],
developers still opt to include such libraries in their TEE ap-
plication.
Second, by including unvetted third-party code in their
TEE application, developers are no longer using TEEs for
their originally intended purpose: TEEs are designed to run
a small set of trusted application components, which do not
need to be run with different privileges. In a large-TCB ap-
plication, in which different components may require differ-
ent access privileges to sensitive data, all code running inside
an enclave still runs with the same privileges. As such, all
third-party code imported into an application running inside
a TEE libOS container has unfettered access to all enclave
memory leaving the application susceptible to data leaks and
corruption.
To make matters worse, most TEE libOSes proposed thus
far do not enforce privilege isolation. This crucial security
mechanism in traditional OSes distinguishes between user-
level and kernel-level processes, ensuring that userspace pro-
cesses cannot access kernel-level memory. On the other
hand, TEE libOSes execute in userspace alongside the ap-
plication they are running. So, despite running inside a TEE,
the libOS’s internal management data structures, such as the
file descriptor table or the mount table, may be corrupted by
vulnerable or malicious third-party code imported by the ap-
plication developer.
To enable developers to reap the benefits of TEEs while
making their applications more robust in the face of unvetted
third-party libraries, we present EnclaveDom, an in-enclave
privilege separation system for large-TCB applications run-
ning inside TEEs.
Privilege separation in legacy applications has been the
subject of a large body of prior proposals, all with the com-
mon goal of enforcing least privilege [33]. Similar to ap-
proaches that leverage process isolation to restrict different
application components’ access to sensitive data or OS re-
sources (e.g., [8, 9, 42]), prior research addressing privilege
separation in Intel SGX applications, for instance, has pro-
posed running individual application components in multi-
ple separate Intel SGX processes with communicating en-
claves [11, 19, 39].
Yet, these systems either only control access to sensitive
data at a per-enclave granularity [11, 19], or they do not pro-
tect the TEE libOS or shim layer itself against application
code [11, 39]. Furthermore, this approach requires inter-
enclave communication between the different processes to
compute on shared data, which incurs significant perfor-
mance overheads.
In contrast, EnclaveDom subdivides a single enclave into
multiple isolated memory compartments, each with its own
access policy. EnclaveDom then stores developer-specified
sensitive in-enclave data objects, such as TLS keys or sen-
sitive datasets, in these compartments. Thus, EnclaveDom
can enforce fine-grained least privilege at the granularity of
in-enclave functions without refactoring the application into
multiple TEE processes.
One major challenge in EnclaveDom’s single-enclave de-
sign is to securely share sensitive enclave data between
functions with different access privileges to the same data.
EnclaveDom addresses this issue using hardware-assisted
memory tagging. Thus, EnclaveDom creates different mem-
ory domains within an enclave by assigning memory tags to
enclave pages.
While the mechanisms we present in this paper apply gen-
erally to TEEs, we realize EnclaveDom on top of Intel SGX
using Memory Protection Keys (MPK), a memory tagging
technique developed at Intel. MPK provides a special hard-
ware register that stores a process’ access privileges to each
MPK tag, and enforces two types of access privileges to
tagged pages (read-only and read-write). Userspace pro-
cesses may then dynamically adjust the access privileges for
different memory tags.
EnclaveDom targets two Intel SGX deployment settings:
(1) containerized applications running in a TEE libOS, and
(2) Intel SGX-native applications developed using the In-
tel SGX SDK [22]. Although Intel SGX-native applications
typically have a smaller TCB than the libOS setting, develop-
ers often still incorporate unvetted third-party libraries into
their enclave code for ease of development. Thus, in both
settings, EnclaveDom helps developers enhance the protec-
tion of sensitive in-enclave data against leaks or tampering
by third-party libraries running in the enclave. In the TEE-
libOS setting, EnclaveDom can additionally be used to im-
plement OS privilege isolation.
To declare sensitive in-enclave data objects and define
those in-enclave functions that are authorized to access them,
developers in EnclaveDom specify the sensitive input argu-
ments or return values of third-party library functions execut-
ing inside in the enclave in a central policy file. At run time,
EnclaveDom then assigns each developer-specified data ob-
ject to an MPK memory domain, and only grants access to
those domains when a privileged in-enclave function is exe-
cuting.
EnclaveDom does not require extensive manual annota-
tions to application source code by the developer, and can
be integrated into TEE libOSes to transparently improve the
protection of the containerized applications they run. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by porting En-
claveDom to the Graphene-SGX libOS [11]. As a prelim-
inary step, our prototype implements privilege isolation in
Graphene-SGX to help protect the internal libOS data struc-
tures, including the file descriptor and mount point tables,
against leaks and tampering by untrusted application-level
code running on top of the libOS in the enclave.
2
SGX Process
Enclave
Tr
am
p
o
lin
e 
co
d
e
Code
Data
Tram
p
o
lin
e 
co
d
e
Untrusted
Code
ecall
ocall
Untrusted
Data
U
se
rs
p
ac
e
K
er
n
el OS/VMM SGX driver
Figure 1: Intel® SGX application memory layout.
Although we needed to modify the Graphene-SGX source
code to add support for EnclaveDom, applications still run
completely unmodified inside the TEE libOS container. To
analyze the security properties of EnclaveDom, we first
study an adversarial application that mounts a libOS data
corruption attack in our Graphene-SGX prototype, and then
examine EnclaveDom’s ability to help prevent additional hy-
pothetical data leak and corruption attacks mounted within
enclave code. We evaluated our EnclaveDom prototype’s
performance via Graphene-SGX system call microbench-
marks, and find that EnclaveDom imposes acceptable per-
formance and modest memory overheads.
2 Background
We instantiate the EnclaveDom memory access control sys-
tem as an experimental combination of Intel SGX and Mem-
ory Protection Keys. This section describes these two tech-
niques, and summarizes the programming framework for In-
tel SGX applications.
2.1 Intel® SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [21, 28] is a trusted
execution environment technology that is designed to pre-
serve the confidentiality of application code and data, even
in the face of untrusted or compromised system software.
At its core, Intel SGX provides an isolated memory region
within the address space of a userspace process, called an
enclave. All code and data within the enclave is encrypted
for the entire lifetime of the application. This design divides
an application into a trusted and an untrusted context, where
the trusted context in the enclave is isolated even from the
underlying OS or VMM.
Intel SGX dictates that the enclave must be entered via
pre-defined entry points called ecalls, and requires that all
Figure 2: The Graphene-SGX system architecture (copied
from [11]).
system calls be made through special trampoline functions
that exit the enclave, called ocalls. At every ecall and ocall,
Intel SGX encrypts or decrypts any memory contents being
passed between the contexts. Further, Intel SGX crypto-
graphically computes an enclave measurement at application
startup, which Intel SGX applications may use to attest to the
authenticity of the enclave code. Fig. 1 shows the high-level
memory layout of an Intel SGX application.
2.2 LibOS-based Containers for Intel® SGX
Intel SGX-specific library OSes (libOS) such as Graphene-
SGX [11], SCONE [3], Panoply [39], and SGXKernel [40],
are designed to facilitate the deployment of Intel SGX ap-
plications by transparently handling all enclave-to-untrusted
transitions necessary to utilize standard OS features. To this
end, libOSes provide a trusted shim layer that implements a
full userspace-level system call interface essentially creating
an in-enclave container that runs unmodified applications on
top of the libOS. As an example, Fig. 2 shows the system
architecture for the Graphene-SGX libOS.
We present a prototype of EnclaveDom based on
Graphene-SGX, but emphasize that our mechanisms are not
specific to Graphene-SGX. One key feature of Graphene-
SGX is its support of dynamically loaded code, requiring
only very few additional steps to develop an application for
Graphene-SGX. To deploy an application, developers must
first specify the resources (e.g., files and network rules) re-
quired by the application in an application-specific manifest
file. Following Intel SGX requirements, the manifest also
specifies certain enclave parameters, such as the maximum
enclave size and maximum number of threads, which devel-
3
opers may configure based on their application’s needs. De-
velopers may then run a Linux executable via the Graphene-
SGX command-line tool.
2.3 Intel® SGX-native Software Development
In order to provide Intel SGX’s security properties, Intel
SGX requires that programmers follow two main develop-
ment rules when creating an Intel SGX-native application.
First, all enclave code subject to enclave measurement
must be static, i.e., built as a statically linked library as part
of the whole application. In other words, a major task facing
Intel SGX application developers is defining a priori all of
the code that runs within the enclave, as well as the ecalls
and ocalls for transitioning into and out of the enclave.
To alleviate this effort, the Intel SGX SDK [22] provides
the Edger8r tool which automatically generates ecall and
ocall trampoline functions based on a developer-specified en-
clave definition file specifying the function signatures for the
functions implementing the enclave entry and exit interface.
More specifically, Edger8r generates the source and header
files for the pre-defined trampoline code, which can then be
included as part of the enclave code.
Second, enclave code must be digitally signed to allow
Intel SGX to verify the enclave measurement as well as ver-
ify the legitimacy of the enclave author. To this end, the
Intel SGX SDK also provides the Sign Tool that automati-
cally computes the enclave measurement and corresponding
signature given the enclave code and the application devel-
oper’s enclave signing key. Upon enclave startup, Intel SGX
can then verify the measurement and signature to confirm the
authenticity of the application’s enclave.
2.4 Memory Protection Keys (MPK)
Memory Protection Keys (MPK) [23] are a recently-
developed feature of the Intel x86 architecture, which en-
ables userspace processes to tag each page table entry with a
4-bit protection key. Thus, applications create up to 16 iso-
lated memory domains within their process address space,
and assign individual pages to different domains.
MPK introduces the PKRU, a per-core 32-bit register that
stores a bitmap of read-only and read-write access bits for
the 16 protection keys. Whenever a process requests access
to a page, the memory management unit checks the PKRU
to verify that the process has sufficient privileges to access
the requested address. To adjust the access permissions to
a given domain, an application calls the WRPKRU instruction.
Though not available on any publicly released CPUs at the
time of writing, MPK may also be used to tag Intel SGX
enclave pages, providing an additional layer of security to
Intel SGX enclave memory.
3 System Model and Design Goals
The goal of EnclaveDom is to provide a privilege separa-
tion system that helps protect large-TCB applications run-
ning inside a TEE, i.e., containerized applications running
inside a TEE libOS as well as large TEE-native applications,
against data leaks and corruption by in-enclave third-party
code. EnclaveDom combines the security properties of TEEs
and hardware-enforced memory tagging to isolate sensitive
in-enclave data objects, and only allow privileged in-enclave
functions to access these data objects.
3.1 Threat Model
As in TEEs, EnclaveDom does not trust any hardware out-
side the CPU, system software including the OS and any
hypervisor, other applications running on the same machine
alongside the TEE application, as well as the untrusted com-
ponent of the application running outside the enclave.
However, EnclaveDom assumes a large TCB program-
ming model for TEEs. That is, application developers wish
to deploy TEE-protected applications while incorporating
third-party libraries that have not been fully vetted (if at all).
Thus, while the TEE application developer may have good
intentions, EnclaveDom does not trust third-party code the
developer imports into her application as part of the enclave
code, since it may contain undiscovered data leak vulnerabil-
ities or attacks. Nevertheless, EnclaveDom maintains trust in
the TEE libOS container running unmodified applications, as
well as in the Intel SGX SDK and its tools used to implement
Intel SGX-native applications.
Importantly, EnclaveDom does not aim to mitigate control
flow attacks such as buffer overflow or ROP attacks. Such
attacks are typically performed as a pathway for an adver-
sary to gain control over the application and execute attack
code. Yet, because the adversary’s code has already inadver-
tently been included in the enclave via a third-party library,
EnclaveDom assumes that this is sufficient to allow the at-
tacker to moderate the control flow of the enclave. Thus,
EnclaveDom’s primary goal is to prevent unauthorized data
accesses that lead to data leaks, corruption or enable other
security attacks. Techniques complementary to our approach
(e.g., [20, 25]) may be employed to safeguard applications
against control flow attacks.
EnclaveDom also does not address side channel or enclave
API misuse vulnerabilities such as Iago attacks [12, 19];
countermeasures to these vulnerabilities have been proposed
in prior research (e.g., [15, 19, 26, 31, 38]) and are comple-
mentary to our work. Much like prior proposals, we also do
not address denial-of-service attacks.
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3.2 Security Properties
Our design for EnclaveDom provides the following three se-
curity properties.
P1: Least Privilege. An in-enclave function may only
access those sensitive enclave data objects that this func-
tion needs to provide its expected functionality. Enclave-
Dom achieves such fine-grained least privilege by placing
developer-specified sensitive enclave data objects in isolated
memory compartments, and enforcing a default-deny access
policy to these compartments at the granularity of individual
functions running inside the enclave.
P2: Single Enclave Isolation. Strong isolation of sen-
sitive in-enclave data does not require partitioning a TEE
application into multiple enclaves. EnclaveDom relies on
a hardware-assisted memory isolation technique capable of
controlling access to individual enclave pages, enabling the
creation of isolated memory compartments within a single
enclave.
P3: Secure Data Sharing. Multiple in-enclave functions
may need to operate on the same sensitive data object. To
enable data sharing between functions that may have differ-
ent access privileges within a single enclave, EnclaveDom’s
memory compartments support dynamic access privileges.
That is, EnclaveDom enforces access permissions to a given
sensitive data object based on the function requesting access.
Non-goals. EnclaveDom automatically controls access to
sensitive data inside a TEE at the level of in-enclave func-
tions. However, EnclaveDom does not aim to provide au-
tomated application code partitioning as in Glamdring [26].
Such execution isolation is orthogonal to our approach, and
could be used in conjunction with EnclaveDom to further
reduce the TCB of TEE applications. We assume that the
application developer has partitioned her application into
trusted and untrusted components either manually or using
an automated technique.
EnclaveDom also does not ensure the correctness of the
sensitive in-enclave data it helps protect; While providing
these stronger security features may improve the integrity
of sensitive enclave inputs and help prevent additional data
leaks via buggy or malicious third-party code at run time,
formally verifying the implementation of enclave code, as
well as the provenance of enclave inputs, is orthogonal to
EnclaveDom’s goals.
4 EnclaveDom Design
Our design for EnclaveDom provides isolation and access
control for sensitive in-enclave data objects in the face of
untrusted third-party enclave code, without partitioning the
TEE application into multiple enclaves. In §5, we describe
how EnclaveDom does not require extensive manual annota-
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Figure 3: Overview of EnclaveDom, which isolates sensi-
tive in-enclave data in memory domains (striped boxes), and
controls access to these domains with three key components
(gray boxes).
tions to application source code by the developer, and how
libOSes can integrate EnclaveDom to transparently improve
the protection of the containerized applications they run.
Much as in prior research [30, 34], EnclaveDom relies
on the application developer’s understanding of the libraries
that they import, and on their high-level expectations of how
these libraries access sensitive application data. Based on
this information, EnclaveDom requires developers to spec-
ify access privileges for individual in-enclave functions to
specific sensitive data objects.
At enclave startup, EnclaveDom maps these data objects
to in-enclave memory domains §4.1 and partitions the en-
clave into corresponding compartments based on the devel-
oper’s policy §4.2. Then at run time, EnclaveDom monitors
the enclave execution, and dynamically adjusts the enclave’s
access to the memory domains according to the currently ex-
ecuting function §4.3. Figure 3 shows the main components
of the EnclaveDom system.
4.1 Primitives
EnclaveDom introduces three primitives that aim to provide
usable yet strong protection improvement of in-enclave data.
A sensitive data object represents a unit of in-enclave data
that developers wish to protect. Each data object has an as-
sociated label, a human-readable string uniquely identify-
ing an object in the policy and EnclaveDom run-time mon-
itor. Examples of sensitive data objects might be a crypto-
graphic key in an encrypted data processing application such
as Opaque [45], or a data buffer containing a genome data
set in a genomics application.
EnclaveDom uses memory domains to represent isolated
memory compartments that hold one or more sensitive data
objects within an enclave address space. Each domain is
then mapped to its own MPK tag to control access to the do-
main at run time. To specify in which domain EnclaveDom
will place a given data object, developers may also assign a
unique label to each domain in their policy.
At run time, EnclaveDom creates a dynamic execution
sandbox, to execute a given in-enclave function with tem-
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porarily elevated access privileges to those memory domains
specified in the developer’s policy. Upon returning from
this function, EnclaveDom immediately revokes access to
those memory domains to limit any further access outside
the scope of the privileged in-enclave function.
4.2 Enclave Compartmentalization
The EnclaveDom Policy Manager maintains an access con-
trol list (ACL) based on the developer-supplied data access
policy. As we show in Fig. 4, at enclave startup, the En-
claveDom Allocator partitions the enclave into memory do-
mains based on the ACL, and is then responsible for allocat-
ing sensitive data objects in their corresponding domains at
run time.
Since EnclaveDom aims to improve the protection of a
wide variety of sensitive data objects, memory domains sup-
port flexible data object sizes. To this end, each memory
domain consists of a pool of enclave pages all tagged with
the same MPK tag. Notably, developers need not know the
exact size of their sensitive data objects in order to isolate
them in a domain since EnclaveDom allows developers to
dynamically allocate domain memory at run time.
This mechanism allows EnclaveDom to support arbitrary
and/or variable data object sizes. For added flexibility, devel-
opers may configure the maximum number of pages per pool
based on an estimate of the maximum memory consumption
of their specified data objects.
It is important to note that there is a trade-off between the
granularity of data object isolation (i.e., security) and an ap-
plication’s memory footprint. Recall from §2.4 that changes
to the PKRU affect all memory pages with the same MPK
tag. This means that, on the one hand, if an application’s
memory domains contain only single, small data objects,
most of the reserved enclave pages in the domains’ pools
will remain unused throughout the lifecycle of the applica-
tion inflating the memory footprint of the application.
However, this policy requires that functions have sufficient
privileges to access the memory domains corresponding to
each data object. On the other hand, a developer may use
the reserved page pool more efficiently by placing multiple
data objects in the same memory domain, at the risk of po-
tentially allowing a function that should only access one of
those data object to leak another sensitive data object in the
same domain.
4.3 Dynamic Sandboxed Execution
MPK restricts access to memory pages at the CPU core level
meaning that all code running on the same core has access to
all tagged pages whose PKRU access bits make those pages
accessible. However, to enforce least privilege, EnclaveDom
cannot allow enclave functions with insufficient privileges to
access specific data objects.
To enhance the protection of sensitive data objects in face
of leaks or tampering by an untrusted third-party library at
run time, EnclaveDom helps to ensure that only those mem-
ory domains to which the currently executing in-enclave
function has privileges are accessible, and denies access to
all other domains. Specifically, upon entering a privileged in-
enclave function, the EnclaveDom Monitor queries the Pol-
icy Manager for the given function’s data object access rules,
and encapsulates the function in an execution sandbox by dy-
namically adjusting the access bits for the MPK tags associ-
ated with the corresponding memory domains (see Fig. 5).
After returning from the sandboxed function, and be-
fore exiting the execution sandbox, the EnclaveDom Mon-
itor then once again restricts access to all memory domains.
While this step may be avoided if the next enclave function
to be executed also has access to some or all of the accessi-
ble domains, EnclaveDom takes a conservative approach and
makes no assumptions about the control flow of applications.
5 Implementation
We implement EnclaveDom as a userspace library that
can be integrated into Intel SGX-specific libOSes and In-
tel SGX-native applications in a handful of steps, and we
demonstrate EnclaveDom’s practicality and benefits with our
EnclaveDom-protected Graphene-SGX libOS prototype.
5.1 EnclaveDom API
To facilitate adoption and usability, our userspace library for
EnclaveDom exposes a small programming interface which
abstracts away the use of MPK. Importantly, the execution
sandboxing API calls can be automatically generated in both
of EnclaveDom’s targeted deployment settings. For develop-
ers writing Intel SGX-native applications, we envision pro-
viding a modified version of the Edger8r tool to minimize
the number of manual changes to application source code.
Further, to allow developers of containerized applications
(i.e., those running inside a libOS) to improve the protec-
tion of sensitive data via EnclaveDom, we could provide a
tool for libOS developers to transparently enforce the appli-
cation developer’s data access policy and automate execution
sandboxing.
We also provide a policy generation tool that automati-
cally populates header files with the internal representation
of the application’s data object ACL (see §5.4). To maintain
the integrity of the developer’s data access policy, we do not
provide any policy-related API calls; the internal representa-
tion of the policy is only accessible within the EnclaveDom
code. Table 1 shows EnclaveDom’s API.
Initialization and teardown. In order to enable Enclave-
Dom’s run-time memory access control, developers must use
6
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Figure 4: The steps that EnclaveDom takes at enclave startup to partition an enclave into memory domains.
Table 1: The EnclaveDom API. In a Graphene-SGX container deployment setting, the API is used by the libOS developers. For
an Intel SGX-native deployment setting, the * denotes API calls that can be automatically generated based on the developer’s
policy.
Initialization/teardown
int enclavedom init(void)
void enclavedom teardown(void)
Data object management*
int enclavedom check input size(const char *obj label, size t size)
int enclavedom check output size(const char *obj label, size t size)
int enclavedom copy from untrusted(const char *obj label, void *untrusted buf)
int enclavedom copy to untrusted(const char *obj label, void *untrusted buf)
Domain memory management*
void *enclavedom malloc(const char *domain label, size t size)
void enclavedom free(const char *domain label, void *addr)
Execution sandboxing*
int enclavedom grant data access(const char *func name)
void enclavedom revoke data access(const char *func name)
the initialization and teardown API. Notably, these functions
should only be called once each, and may be called either
from the untrusted application context or from within the en-
clave. Given the data object ACL generated at enclave build
time, enclavedom init() is responsible for pre-allocating
the enclave pages reserved for memory domains, and for
provisioning and mapping MPK tags to memory domains.
Correspondingly, enclavedom teardown() releases provi-
sioned MPK tags with the OS, and frees the memory domain
enclave pages. These two API calls are the only EnclaveDom
functionality that libOS developers and Intel SGX-native ap-
plication developers must manually incorporate into their ap-
plication source code.
Data object management. Intel SGX-native application de-
velopers may wish to pass data into the enclave and treat it as
sensitive data, or return a data object to the untrusted context
as the result of an enclave computation. To support passing
sensitive data objects during ecalls and ocalls, EnclaveDom
provides developers with an API for copying a given sensi-
tive data object into or out of the enclave. As part of passing
sensitive data objects between contexts, EnclaveDom also al-
lows developers to verify the size of the data objects. This
API may only be called from within an enclave. To ease
adoption, these API calls can be easily integrated into the
Intel SGX SDK’s Edger8r edge routine generation tool.
Domain memory management. As we describe in §4.2,
applications in EnclaveDom may allocate data in memory
domains dynamically at run time. EnclaveDom’s memory
management API allows libOS and Intel SGX-native appli-
cation developers to either replace or complement existing
malloc calls inside the enclave with domain-specific mem-
ory allocations. As with the data object management API,
this functionality can be integrated into the Edger8r tool to
facilitate the adoption process for Intel SGX-native applica-
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Table 2: Supported data access semantics and their corresponding policy rule specification.
Access semantics Object specification
no writable objects OO = /0
all writable objects OI = /0
blanket access to domain #<domain label>:
skip object size verification <object label>#<domain label>:
Enclave
private RSA key
data setMonitor
Allocator
Code Data
Application 
data
Third-party 
libraries
Trusted 
application 
code
Policy Mgr
1
2
3
Figure 5: The steps that EnclaveDom takes when entering
an in-enclave function that may require access to domain-
protected data.
tions.
Execution sandboxing. While developers must explic-
itly specify each sensitive data object that a privileged
in-enclave function may access in their policy, Enclave-
Dom transparently maintains all data object-to-domain
mappings. Developers then use EnclaveDom’s execu-
tion sandboxing API to specify the boundaries of a func-
tion sandbox by encapsulating privileged function calls be-
tween a enclavedom grant data access() call at the
entry of a privileged function, and the corresponding
enclavedom revoke data access() call after returning.
In §5.4, we describe how EnclaveDom can help to automate
this process for application developers in both deployment
settings.
5.2 Policy Specification
EnclaveDom requires application developers to declare
sensitive data objects and specify corresponding enclave
function-level access rules in a static policy file. In addition,
libOS developers may also generate a EnclaveDom policy to
improve the protection of internal libOS data structures that
is included in the libOS core (see §5.3). Every access rule
takes the form:
OI > f unc > OO
where f unc is the name of the in-enclave function affected
by the given rule. OI specifies those sensitive data objects to
which f unc has read-only access (i.e., function inputs), and
OO specifies those data objects to which f unc has read-write
access (e.g., function return values).
In an access rule, OI and OO are written as comma-
separated lists of object specifications formatted as
<object label>#<domain label>:<object size>.
To allow developers to tailor their policies to their applica-
tion’s security and performance requirements, EnclaveDom
supports flexible data access semantics, detailed in Table 2.
Additionally, EnclaveDom does not require a 1:1 corre-
spondence between data objects and memory domains. That
is, multiple individual data objects may be placed into the
same domain. Such access rules may be beneficial in cases
in which a number of different in-enclave functions require
access to the same individual data objects.
5.3 Privilege Isolation for Graphene-SGX
As described in §2.2, libOSes such as Graphene-SGX [11]
provide application developers with a mechanism for reaping
the benefits of Intel SGX, while running unmodified appli-
cations. However, Graphene-SGX’s trusted shim layer per-
forming privileged operations (i.e., system calls) runs with
the same privileges as the application binary and any third-
party libraries imported into the application. This lack of
privilege isolation poses a threat to the libOS and any appli-
cations it runs because vulnerabilities or attacks in untrusted
third-party code may corrupt or leak sensitive internal libOS
data.
As a preliminary step to demonstrate EnclaveDom’s abil-
ity to improve the protection of large-TCB applications
against third-party code, we have built a EnclaveDom-
enabled prototype of the Graphene-SGX libOS implement-
ing a privilege isolation mechanism. Our current prototype
enforces privilege isolation by placing all file system-related
data structures into memory domains, and by only granting
access to this data within relevant system calls. More specif-
ically, we declare two memory domains: handle dom con-
tains all file descriptor-specific metadata, and fs dom con-
tains all file system management metadata (e.g., the mount
table).
Our decision to create these two domains was largely
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based on Graphene-SGX’s implementation of the file system
interface, which treats these two types of metadata separately
employing a separate memory manager for each. As such,
we were able to replace Graphene-SGX’s internal memory
allocation calls in these memory managers with EnclaveDom
domain memory management API calls for the correspond-
ing memory domains.
We currently declare data access rules for 32 libOS sys-
tem calls, for which we automatically generate the Enclave-
Dom policy code with our policy generator. However, port-
ing EnclaveDom to Graphene-SGX required us to manually
implement the sandboxing wrapper functions for the 32 sys-
tem calls since the libOS employs a custom interface to In-
tel SGX; this interface is unfortunately not compatible with
the official Intel SGX SDK, hindering us from automatically
generating the EnclaveDom system call wrappers with the
Edger8r tool. Furthermore, to comply with Graphene-SGX’s
system ABI and make EnclaveDom API calls from the Li-
brary OS layer, we needed to create additional wrapper func-
tions for EnclaveDom’s API in the Host layer.
Nevertheless, our instrumentation only affects the
Graphene-SGX libOS itself, so application developers who
do not wish to provide additional application-level data pro-
tections can still remain agnostic to EnclaveDom (as well as
Intel SGX) by running unmodified applications on top of our
EnclaveDom-enabled Graphene-SGX prototype.
5.4 EnclaveDom Code Generation
Policy generator. EnclaveDom improves the protection of
the developer’s policy against tampering by untrusted code
by leveraging Intel SGX’s measurement of static enclave
code. To avoid having developers manually create an inter-
nal representation of their policy, we provide developers with
a policy parser that automatically populates EnclaveDom’s
policy data structures based on the developer’s policy, and
generates a header file containing the internal representation
of the data object ACL.
Developers run the policy generator as an additional step
in their application build process, and include the generated
ACL header file in the libOS or application source code. The
EnclaveDom API can then access these policy data structures
directly at run time.
Finally, the policy generator tool allows libOS and Intel
SGX-native application developers to configure the number
of enclave pages reserved for a memory domain. If no do-
main pool size is specified, the default of four 4-KB pages is
used.
EnclaveDom Edger8r tool. Since most Intel SGX-native
applications do not compute on static sensitive data, devel-
opers must often pass sensitive data objects between the un-
trusted context and the enclave at run time. To examine how
much we can reduce the burden on developers and to help to
ensure that EnclaveDom-protected Intel SGX-native appli-
cations enhance the protection of sensitive data objects, we
built an experimental EnclaveDom-aware Edger8r tool that
automatically inserts data object and domain memory allo-
cation calls in the generated trampoline code based on the
developer’s EnclaveDom policy.
In addition, EnclaveDom can bootstrap the vanilla
Edger8r’s functionality to create trampoline code to create
application-specific wrappers around privileged in-enclave
functions to create the function execution sandboxes. These
generated sandboxing wrappers include calls to Enclave-
Dom’s execution sandboxing API surrounding the actual call
to the privileged function. Developers would then only be re-
quired to replace the calls to the original function with calls
to the sandboxing wrapper function to ensure that the rele-
vant sensitive data objects may be accessed within the scope
of the sandboxed function. Any “un-sandboxed” calls to the
original function would proceed but attempts to access sensi-
tive data objects will be blocked by EnclaveDom’s Monitor.
EnclaveDom for containerized applications. While not
currently implemented in our Graphene-SGX prototype, li-
bOS developers may wish to provide support for Enclave-
Dom to application developers. To keep the burden on the
application developers minimal, they would only be required
to specify a EnclaveDom policy specifying the privileged
third-party functions their application calls and the sensitive
data objects these functions may access. After automatically
generating the ACL header file and including this header
file into their application’s source code. We then envision
Graphene-SGX transparently parsing the application’s data
object ACL header file, allocating the developer-specified
data objects in their respective memory domains, and cre-
ating the application-specific EnclaveDom’s dynamic execu-
tion sandboxes at run time.
6 Evaluation
We evaluate EnclaveDom’s security properties by perform-
ing a case study of an adversarial application that we run in
our prototype, and present an analysis of additional hypo-
thetical vulnerabilities in enclave code. To evaluate the per-
formance and memory overheads EnclaveDom imposes on
the Graphene-SGX libOS, we ran microbenchmarks to un-
derstand how the underlying EnclaveDom operations affect
our measurements.
Our tests were performed on a machine with an exper-
imental Intel CPU with two 224 GB Intel SSDs, running
Ubuntu 17.04 on Linux Kernel 4.10.0-42-generic. Intel
CPUs that feature both Intel SGX and MPK are unavail-
able commercially at the time of writing.1 Further, the policy
for our prototype contains access rules for 32 libOS system
1As of May 2020, we have successfully demonstrated EnclaveDom on
an Intel Core i7-1065G7 (Ice Lake) platform.
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calls, and is configured to provision a maximum of four 4-
KB memory pages per domain.
6.1 Security Analysis
To evaluate EnclaveDom’s security properties, we first do
a case study on an application that attempts to tamper with
Graphene-SGX’s file descriptor table. We developed this ad-
versarial application in our laboratory setting, demonstrating
the feasibility of such attacks without EnclaveDom’s protec-
tions, and EnclaveDom’s broader applicability to similar at-
tacks. Furthermore, we also analyze additional hypothetical
vulnerabilities and memory attacks in enclave code.
Case study: Descriptor Table Corruption. To demonstrate
EnclaveDom’s ability to mitigate unauthorized accesses, we
examine the instance of file descriptor table corruption in a
libOS-based Intel SGX application. If successful, such at-
tacks can be especially detrimental since they may enable a
wide range of malicious application behaviors.
In this case study, the adversarial application imports our
specially crafted malicious library which attempts to corrupt
Graphene-SGX’s file descriptor table (or FD table). We ran
this adversarial application in vanilla Graphene-SGX and our
EnclaveDom-enabled Graphene-SGX prototype, and found
that the attack succeeds in vanilla Graphene-SGX, where En-
claveDom helps prevent this attack via a segfault.
This attack is possible in vanilla Graphene-SGX because
the libOS itself and the adversarial application run in the
same address space. Recall from §5.3 that our prototype
places the FD table in the handle dom memory domain,
which is only accessible during those libOS system calls
specified in our prototype’s data access policy. In other
words, since our crafted library does not make system calls
that EnclaveDom executes in a sandbox, but rather attempts
to access the FD table via a reverse-engineered code path
that does not run inside a dynamic sandbox, access to the
handle dom is never granted to the crafted library.
While the attack in this case study may seem contrived at
first glance, we believe that file descriptor table corruption
demonstrates a broader vulnerability class that allows third-
party code to abuse its access to in-enclave data. Enclave-
Dom mitigates this threat to TEE applications which arises
specifically because developers include untrusted third-party
code.
In addition, this case study shows that EnclaveDom can
help prevent a more insidious class of attacks capable of cir-
cumventing more traditional access control methods such as
system call interposition: since our studied attack does not
require direct system calls to access a sensitive data object,
interposition mechanisms that verify that the application is
only accessing authorized OS resources would not even be
invoked.
Hypothetical vulnerabilities. We consider a broad range
of vulnerabilities that untrusted third-party code running in-
side an enclave may hypothetically be able to exploit in order
to leak sensitive in-enclave data to the untrusted application
component. Table 3 summarizes three hypothetical vulnera-
bilities, and the specific EnclaveDom mechanism that miti-
gates the vulnerability.
EnclaveDom allows developers to grant specific in-
enclave functions privileges to access certain sensitive data
objects. However, an untrusted third-party function running
inside the enclave may attempt to escalate its own privileges
by calling a more privileged function in order to gain unau-
thorized access to sensitive data objects. EnclaveDom helps
prevent such confused deputy attacks [16] via its dynamic
execution sandbox mechanism (see §4.3).
Untrusted in-enclave code may attempt to manipulate the
value of the PKRU by including direct WRPKRU instructions
within its code. Since MPK does not currently verify the
origin of WRPKRU instructions in a userspace process, one vi-
able mitigation strategy that EnclaveDom could employ is
static analysis and binary instrumentation in order to detect
and replace errant WRPKRU instructions in non-EnclaveDom
enclave code (similarly as in ERIM [41]).
Finally, since MPK relies on the OS for provisioning pro-
tection keys, in-enclave code may attempt to gain authorized
access to MPK-protected memory or corrupt the PKRU by
directly making pkey mprotect or pkey set system calls
via an ocall. One potential technique for mitigating these is-
sues may be system call interposition in the kernel to monitor
the origin of these calls.
6.2 Performance Microbenchmarks
Execution time overhead. To analyze the impact of En-
claveDom on the performance of the Graphene-SGX li-
bOS, we took microbenchmarks of the open, stat, fstat,
mmap, and close system calls. Recall from §5 that our
EnclaveDom-enabled prototype of Graphene-SGX isolates
the libOS internal file descriptor and file system management
data structures (e.g. mount table) into two memory domains.
Thus, we chose to benchmark these five system calls since
they require access either only to the file descriptor domain
handle dom, the file system management domain fs dom, or
both, and sought to determine how accessing the different
memory domains affects performance.
We used the lat syscall benchmark of LMbench
2.5 [29], which stress tests six system calls; for each LM-
bench experiment, we then measured the amount of execu-
tion time of each our target system calls spent performing
EnclaveDom operations. Table 4 shows the mean percent-
age of execution time that EnclaveDom operations comprise
in our five benchmarked syscalls as well as the EnclaveDom
memory domain that each syscall accesses internally.
We observe two groups of system calls: the first group,
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Table 3: Hypothetical vulnerabilities in enclave code, mitigation strategies, and whether EnclaveDom currently implements
them.
Vuln Type Mitigation Implemented?
confused deputy attack execution sandbox Y
WRPKRU misuse static analysis N
MPK OS-level API misuse syscall interposition N
Table 4: Mean percentage of execution time spent perform-
ing EnclaveDom operations for five libOS syscalls.
% time in EnclaveDom accessed memdom(s)
open 6.4 handle, fs
close 49.1 handle
stat 49.9 fs
fstat 50.1 handle, fs
mmap 0.8 handle
Table 5: Peak memory usage for internal EnclaveDom data
structures for each domain as well as Graphene-SGX as a
whole in our prototype.
memory usage (in bytes)
handle dom 98
fs dom 1030
Total 1200
mmap and open, spends only a small portion of execution
time (at most 6.4%) performing EnclaveDom operations,
while the second group of syscalls spends about 50% of the
execution time performing EnclaveDom operations. This re-
sult is perhaps not entirely unsurprising given that the pri-
mary purpose of the system calls in the second group is to
access the file system metadata, while open and mmap per-
form a much larger number of tasks beyond manipulating
the internal file system data structures.
Memory overhead. Our evaluation additionally sought to
quantify the memory overhead that EnclaveDom imposes
on Graphene-SGX. Specifically, we measure the additional
memory required to maintain the application ACL and in-
ternal memory domain management data structures for each
domain as well as for Graphene-SGX. Table 5 shows the me-
dian peak memory consumption in bytes of EnclaveDom’s
internal data structures for our Graphene-SGX prototype as
a whole as well as each memory domain during our syscall
microbenchmarks above.
We find that EnclaveDom’s memory overhead is very
modest requiring only an additional 1.2 KB of memory for
the entire Graphene-SGX libOS, and a mean of 0.6 KB per
memory domain. Note that our configuration provisions far
more memory per domain than is required.
7 Related Work
In-Intel SGX memory protection. A small number of prior
proposals have sought to enhance memory protection within
an Intel SGX enclave. SGXBounds [25] uses tagged pointers
for efficient bounds-checking within an Intel SGX enclave.
SGX-Shield [35] provides a new ASLR scheme to improve
the protection of Intel SGX applications against memory cor-
ruption attacks inside the enclave. T-SGX [38] leverages the
hardware transactional memory provided by Intel® TSX in
order to help prevent controlled-channel attacks in an Intel
SGX enclave. Multi-domain SFI [37] subdivides an Intel
SGX enclave into multiple memory domains using MPX’s
hardware-enforced memory bounds checking to implement
privilege isolation and multi-process library OSes within a
single enclave.
All of these prior proposals (except Multi-domain SFI)
aim to prevent a particular class of memory attacks. In con-
trast, EnclaveDom operates at the granularity of application-
level data objects to help developers prevent sensitive data
leaks in a more intuitive fashion. Multi-domain SFI is closest
to our approach, but we believe EnclaveDom’s use of MPK,
a technique designed specifically for memory access control,
provides a more adequate solution for our goals.
Intel hardware memory protection in legacy applica-
tions. Numerous prior proposals have leveraged novel tech-
niques available in Intel processors to help protect sensitive
application data within a single address space.
ERIM [41], MemSentry-PKU [24] and Janus [17] use
MPK to partition a legacy application’s address space into
two or more domains to isolate sensitive application data.
EnclaveDom builds on this prior research generalizing the
use of MPK to implement multiple memory domains and ap-
plies this mechanism to Intel SGX applications. leveraging
MPK to partition an Intel SGX enclave and isolate sensitive
in-enclave data objects in separate domains.
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Systems such as Dune [6], MemSentry [24], and
Janus [17] rely on Intel® VT-x virtualization hardware to
create intra-process isolated compartments. Unlike Enclave-
Dom, the main goal of these approaches is to provide execu-
tion isolation for running different application components
in separate address spaces. EnclaveDom’s main goal is to
help protect sensitive application data shared between differ-
ent application components by controlling access to sensitive
data objects at run time.
Non-Intel hardware memory isolation. Other architec-
tures, most notably ARM, also provide techniques designed
for finer-grained memory access control. For instance,
ARMlock [46], Shreds [13], and FlexDroid [34] leverage
ARM memory domains, a technique very similar to MPK,
to allow developers to create a number of isolated execution
regions with associated private memory compartments.
Process isolation. A large number of prior proposals have
leveraged OS primitives to restrict application components in
legacy and mobile applications. Systems such as Wedge [7],
Privtrans [9], Passe [8], CodeJail [44], AdSplit [36] and
BreakApp [42] partition an application into multiple pro-
cesses to run unprivileged components in isolated address
spaces. Ryoan [19] partitions an Intel SGX application into
separate Intel SGX processes as a means to isolate different
application components.
While such process-based isolation provides strong mem-
ory protections, these approaches require significant devel-
opment efforts to re-architect a monolithic application for a
multi-process model. EnclaveDom’s single-process design,
on the other hand, provides a more practical approach for In-
tel SGX application developers that does not require major
application refactoring, and still provides strong hardware-
assisted memory isolation.
Intra-process isolation. Arbiter [43], SMV [18], Light-
weight Contexts [27], and Pyronia [30] partition a single
process address space using multiple page tables in or-
der to control access to different memory compartments
at intra-process granularities (e.g., thread-level in Arbiter
or SMV). EnclaveDom borrows many concepts from these
intra-process isolation proposals, but relies on more efficient
hardware-based techniques that are more adequate for use in
Intel SGX applications.
8 Conclusion
We have presented EnclaveDom, a privilege separation sys-
tem for large-TCB applications running in trusted execution
environments. EnclaveDom combines the security of TEEs
with memory tagging to help prevent sensitive data leaks and
corruption by untrusted third-party code imported into con-
tainerized and TEE-native applications. To avoid partition-
ing an enclave into multiple TEE processes, EnclaveDom
isolates sensitive data objects within a single enclave address
space. As such, EnclaveDom supports data sharing between
different in-enclave functions, while enforcing least privilege
data access policies.
We have implemented EnclaveDom as a userspace API
for large-TCB Intel SGX applications that uses MPK for en-
clave memory tagging. To demonstrate EnclaveDom’s prop-
erties, we implement OS privilege isolation in the Graphene-
SGX library OS. Our evaluation of our EnclaveDom-enabled
Graphene-SGX prototype imposes a very modest memory
overhead and can help protect containerized applications
against unauthorized accesses to sensitive in-enclave data.
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